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NOTES
IS THE DICTATION OF A LIBELOUS LETTER TO A STE-
NOGRAPHER A SUFFICIENT PUBLICATION OF THE
LIBEL TO SUSTAIN A CIVIL SUIT FOR
DAMAGES?
I.
It is of course settled law that a libelous communication addressed
to the person libeled and received and read by him only will not give
rise to a cau=e of action unless the plaintiff in such case can prove
that the defamatory matter was published to some third person-that
is, that through no fault of plaintiff, the libel was brought to the
attention of someone other than himself and the defendant.
Several rather interesting questions have arisen in cases where the
only publication that a plaintiff in a suit for libel can prove is the
dictation of the libelous or defamatory letter to the stenographer em-
ployed by the defendant. It is obvious that this question becomes
imporant only in the following two instances:
1. Where the letter dictated and transcribed by the stenographer
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is written upon a privileged occasion as between the communicants.
2. Where the letter is sent to and receivd by the person libeled
and read only by him.
The questions considered by the courts are these: What is the
status of the publication to the stenographer? Is there a publica-
tion in the sense that some third person has been informed of the
defamatory written statements? Is the publication, if held to be such,
privileged between the employer and the stenographer? Must the
plaintiff sue for libel or for slander?
It may be said at the outset that the courts have held unanimously
that the dictation to the stenographer constitutes a publication in the
technical sense above referred to, thereby rejecting the defendant's
ingenious argument in the Maryland case1 that a stenographer or clerk
does not receive the meaning and significance of the defamatory matter
any more than the typewriting machine--that the stenographer must
be looked upon as a mere mechanical device.
That there is any privilege between the employer and the stenog-
rapher can hardly be true, for there may be nothing of interest to the
stenographer in the subject matter of the letter, however great the
privilege between plaintiff and the defendant.
The law on this phase of the question, namely, the dictation of a
libelous letter to a stenographer when the letter itself is written upon
a privileged occasion seems to be well settled both in England and in
this country.
In an English case decided in 1869,2 plaintiff sought to hold a
corporation liable for an alleged libel. The evidence showed that the
directors of the corporation had given to a printer a report, submit-
ted to them by the auditors of the company who were employed to
investigate plaintiff's management of some of the corporation busis-
ness, that the report thus submitted was defamatory, and that the
report was to be sent or given to each stockholder. The court decided
having failed to show that the directors in having the report printed
that the report to the stockholders was privileged and the plaintiff,
acted maliciously, was not entitled to recover. The court said:
"I think we should be going against what I may call prog-
ress if we were to hold that the delivery of the manuscript of
the report to the printer for the purpose of having it printed
is a publication which prevents the communication from being
privileged."
In 1891, however, the English Court of Appeals" decided that
I Gambril v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48.
2 Lawless v. Cotton Co., 1869 4 Q. B. 262.
'Pullman v. Hill, 1891 1 Q. B. 524.
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where a libelous letter is dictated to a stenographer in defendant's
employ, who transcribes the letter from the stenographic notes, and
hands it to defendant, who signs, it, and has a letter press copy made
of it by a clerk the dictation of the letter constitutes a sufficient pub-
lication of the libe! and plaintiff may recover without proving actual
malice.
It was contended in that case that business conditions had changed
considerably, that it was almost an absolute necessity to employ ste-
nographers in conducting and managing large mercantile establish-
ments, and that on account of these circumstances the dictation of all
letters to a stenographer does not constitute such a publication as is
contemplated in the law of libel and slander. In other words, the
defendants contended that the legal inference of malice, which springs
up in every case where one publishes a false statement about some
person to another who has no interest in the subject matter of the
defamatory statement, cannot be applied in those cases in which the
only publication complained of is the dictation to the stenographer or
clerk, whose relation to the defendant, and the circumstances under
which the slanderous words come to his knowledge, are such as to
clearly rebut the legal inference of malice.
The court, however, rejected defendant's contention both as to the
alleged privilege existing between the employer and his stenographer
and also those referring to the necessities and exigencies of business.
Of the latter the court says:
"I do not think that the necessities or the luxuries of
business can alter the law of England. If a merchant wishes
to write a letter containing defamatory matter and to keep
a copy of the letter, he had better make the copy himself."
This and other statements of the court in the same case are
rather broad, in fact much broader than necessary as far as the de-
cision of the case is concerned, and on the face of it this case might be
said to be decisive upon the question of the dictation to the stenog-
iapher in all cases, both as to letters written upon a privileged occasion,
and those written upon a non-privileged occasion. The doctrine of
Pullman vs. Hill was, however, reviewed and its effect limited in the
case of Boxsius vs. Goblet Freres,' decided by the same court three
years later. That was a case in which a solicitor, who had been
engaged to make a collection of money due defendant from plaintiff,
dictated a libelous letter to his stenographer who wrote it and sent it
to plaintiff. Two of the judges who sat in the case of Puliman vs.
Hill took part in the discussion and decision of this case and held
that the rule adopted in Pullman vs. Uill was to be applied to such
S1 0. B. 842 (1894).Washington University Open Scholarship
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cases only where the occasion upon which the letter was written was
not privileged, that a letter, though libelous, written by a solicitor in
the ordinary course of his business was privileged, since it is a solici-
tor's duty to his client to do everything he deems necessary to obtain
satisfaction. The letter being written upon a privileged occasion, the
court holds that the solicitor, therefore, did an act on a privileged
occasion and defendant could riot be held liable unless actual malice
was shown. In the Pullman vs. Hill case the occasion for writing the
libelous letter was clearly not privileged.
This distinction between the two cases and the rules laid down
in each is recognized and approved in a case decided in the King's
Bench in 1907.5
The courts of Canada, though for a time confused by the appar-
ent conflict in decisions, finally recognized both these rules, the Pull-
man case being followed by the Court of Appeals in a decision in
which the Divisional Court was reversed, although two of the judges
were inclined not to adopt this rule.
"The stenographer ought not to be regarded as a third person.
The communications to him ought to be treated as privileged," says
one of the judges, while the other speaks as follows: "As at present
advised, I am disposed to think that if the matter was res integra I
would give in my adhesion to the view thus expressed as most in har-
mony with our present conditions."
In our own country there are numerous decisions involving both
the question considered in the Boxsius v. Goblet Freres case and the
one decided in the Pullman v. Hill case, and without exception all of
them follow the English cases.
"This privilege was not lost because the report was incidentally
brought to the notice of the stenographer in the office of Powell and
Doyle," said the Supreme Court of Arkansas' in considering the case
of a libelous communication made upon a privileged occasion and inci-
dentally brought to the attention of the stenographer. The courts of
Georgia', Mississippi,' and New York10 have followed the English
case of Boxsius v. Goblet Freres and the Supreme Court of Mary-
land1 in adopting the rule in Pullman v. Hill recognized the distinction
between the cases alluded to above. The New York case would make
a distinction between the case in which the defendant is a corporation
and one in which the defendant is an individual, and holds that, since
'1 K. B. 371.
a Puterbaugh v. Gold Medal, etc., 7 Ontario L R. 58.
I Bohlinger v. Insurance Co., 100 Ark. 477.
$Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414.
' Catwright v. Fischel, 113 Miss. 359.
10 Owen v. Publishing Co., 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 465.
21 Gambrell v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48.
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a corporation can act only through its agents, the acts of the person
dictating, the one transcribing it, and of the one who makes a letter-
press copy of it must in the law be considered as one act of a single
individual, and that, therefore, there has been no publication of the
libel to a third person. "It may be," said the court, "that the dicta-
tion to the stenographer and her reading of the letter would consti-
tute a publication of the same by the person dictating it, if the rela-
tion existing between the manager and the copyist was that of master
and servant and the letter be held not to be privileged." The last
few words would seem to indicate that the New York court would
also recognize the difference maintained by the English courts, but
would apply it only in such cases where the defendant is an individual.
The most thorough and elucidating case on this subject is the
case referred to above decided in Maryland. The principle involved
in this case is exactly like that involved in the Pullman v. Hill case.
Defendant's counsel argued that Pullman v. Hill was practically over-
ruled by the decision in the later case of Boxsius v. Goblet Freres and
even if Pullman v. Hill was still law in England it ought not to be
followed in the United States. The court, however, adopts the law of
Pullman v. Hill and intimates that its decision would be otherwise
had the libel in question been written upon a privileged occasion.
"But there was no question of privilege in Pullman v. Hill and
there is none here," says the court, "as the appellant owed no duty
in the matter to anyone." This case is cited and followed by the
Supreme Court of Alabama 12 which says:
"The dictation of a libelous letter to a stenographer who
copies it from his notes on a typewriting machine and the
subsequent signing thereof by the person dictating is a pub-
lication of the contents of the letter sufficient to support libel
or slander although there is no communication of its contents
to any other person."13.
II.
The question as to whether or not the plaintiff must sue for slan-
der or whether he may sue for libel was not pressed in the argument
of Pullman v. Hill and received but little attention from the court,
although Lord Esher did say that libel consisted of "making known
the defamatory matter after it has been written to some person other
than the person to whom it is written." The court's decision that the
dictation of the defamatory letter was a libel in the face of its own
definition as to what constituted libel is strongly criticised by Mr.
12 Ferdon v. DickensJ61 Ala. 181.
13 Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181 1. c. 187.
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Odgers," who says, "It is doubtful whether the facts as proved at
the trial in Pullman v. Hill support the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals on the issue of publication. Dictating to a shorthand clerk words
which that shorthand clerk takes down in writing is not publishing a
libel to the shorthand clerk. No libel is yet in existence. Such dic-
tation may be an actionable slander-indeed in Pullman v. Hill it was
so-but the fact that spoken words are intended to be written down
after they are uttered does not make their utterance the publication
of a libel."
This criticism of Mr. Odgers was urged in a Canadian case but
the court said,-"As to this, however, I think it is reasonably to be in-
ferred, looking at all the reports of the case that the letter after having
been signed was handed back to the typewriter."
This phase of the question is, however, settled in Gambrill v.
Schooley (supra.) The criticism by Mr. Odgers of Pullman v. Hill
was called to the attention of the court and counsel insisted that there
was no proof of the publication of a libel, because, at the time of
the occurrence of the publication, no written defamation was in exist-
ence, and the corn nunication up to that period being entirely oral, slan-
der was the only proper form of action which could be maintained.
This contention was rejected by the court, which said, "We have
no doubt that the dictation of these letters to the stenographer was the
publication of a slander, for which, if nothing further had been done
by either, an action of slander could have been maintained, but we
have no more doubt that the stenographic notes, the typewritten copy,
and the letter press copy constituted the publication of a libel and
that either slander or libel could be maintained as the appellee should
elect." This statement, it would seem, is followed by the Alabama
court in the case above cited from that state.
The following conclusions may therefore be drawn as to the law
on the subject as laid down and recognized by the courts.
First, It has been established by numerous English decisions and
affirned in this country, that where there is a duty as between two
persons which forms the ground of a privileged occasion, the person
exercising the privilege is entitled to take all reasonable means of so
doing, and the use of the ordinary and reasonable means of giv-
ing effect to the privilege does not destroy it. The dictation to a
stenographer of a letter written upon a privileged occasion, therefore,
is not an actionable publication, even though the same may be
libelous.
Second, Where the letter dictated is not one written upon a priv-
ileged occasion the dictation to the stenographer is a sufficient publi-
14 Oders nn Libel and Slander. 5th Edition, 161, 162.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol4/iss1/4
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cation and is in law presumed to be malicious even though the letter
was not sent out of the oftie and no one but the person dictating and
the stenographer knew the contents thereof.
Third, Under the New York decision, if the defendant is a cor-
poration, the acts of all of its agents in connection with the writing
of the letters will be considered as one single act, so that there is no
publication and consequently it would make no difference whether the
communication was or was not privileged.
Fourth, That the plaintiff has the right to sue for slander or libel
as he may elect.
In spite of the fact that there is quite respectable authority on this
point, it is rather difficult to understand why a distinction should be
made between the case of a letter written upon a privileged and one
written upon an occasion not privileged, since the necessary effect of
all the decisions is that the communication of the libelous letter to
the stenographer in the regular routine of business is made upon
an occasion and under such circumstances as will rebut the legal
inference of malice which is a necessary ingredient of actionable libel
and which is inferred in all cases where the defamatory matter is
published to a stranger. Having recognized a special relationship,
we think that it is but arbitrary to insist upon the distinction that courts
have made.
What difference can there possibly be said to exist whether the
libelous communication is ultimately to come into the hands of a per-
son whom the author, if sued, will be able to show to have been inter-
ested in the subject matter, or is to come into the hands of a person
not so interested. The intent on the part of the defendant in employ-
ing his stenographer to write up the libelous letter, his malice, his
desire to hold up the person libeled to ridicule, and shame, and injure
him in his reputation, is the same in both instances as far as the ste-
nographer is concerned.
Supposing the same kind of a letter is addressed to two differept
persons. One letter is sent to a person having an interest in the
subject matter of the communication, the other to one having no such
interest. The letters are exactly alike, both are dictated by and to
the same person, both transcribed by the same person, nothing being
said to the stenographer as to the occasion upon which either letter
is written. It turns out that one of the letters is written upon a priv-
ileged occasion and the other is not, and further, that the one sup-
posed by the defendant to have been privileged is held by the court
not to be a privileged communication. In one case it is said that there
is no such publication as will entitle a plaintiff to recover without proof
Af !,k,l nnf;21p whle in the other the mere oroof of the dictationWashington University Open Scholarship
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to the stenographer is held to be a sufficient publication without proof
of any actual malice. In fact, there was more malice on the part of
the defendant in dictating the first letter than in dictating the second,
and to hold that the law will infer malice in the second case is con-
trary to the true facts of the case.
It finally comes down to this--in the case of a letter not privil.
eged the law imputes malice to the defendant ab initio, and, therefore,
malice is to be presumed or imputed to him because he has dictated
the letter to his stenographer. In the case of privileged communica-
tions malice is not presumed, therefore, the dictation to the stenog-
rapher is not malicious. In the one case the defendant is held liable
for doing an act in aid of his unlawful purpose, while in the other he
is excused because, his purpose not being wrongful, the acts done in
aid of that purpose are not wrongful. This sort of distinction between
the two cases supposed and the ground of such distinction may be well
and reasonable enough when it comes to punishing one criminally,
but it seems to the writer that it loses its force when an attempt is
made to apply it to civil actions for damages. The wrong or injury
to the plaintiff's reputation-which has been time and again held to be
the foundation of plaintiff's action-is not healed nor enhanced by
the fact that in the one case the letter was privileged and in the other
it was not. The effect upon the mind of the stenographer for which
he is allowed to recover if the occasion was not privileged is exactly
the same in either case.
We submit that in view of the decisions, the proper test to de-
termine whether or not a publication to a stenographer is sufficient
to support an action for libel should be this: Does a consideration of
all the evidence show that the defendant acted maliciously and intended
to hold plaintiff up to ridicule and defame and injure his reputation.
If so, then in either case the defendant should be made to pay dam-
ages and vice versa. Under such a rule no matter whether the libelous
letter finally reached th- hands of a person who is found to have
received it upon a privileged occasiun or whether it turns out that he
had no such interest which made the communication privileged, the
test of defendant's liability would be: Did the defendant act malic-
iously, or has plaintiff proven any malice on the part of defendant
excepting that which would ordinarily be presumed in case of a publi-
cation to a stranger? There is nothing in all of the decided cases cited
which would conflict in principle and in language with this test.
JOS. H. GRAND.
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